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On 27th and 28th of September 2012 the fourth German-Nordic-Baltic Forum took place. The conference was entitled “EU 
Responses to external challenges as seen from Germany, Poland, Nordic and Baltic countries and the EU neighbourhood”. 
Not only experts from the Baltic States, the Nordic States, Poland and Germany participated in the forum, but for the first 
time also scientists coming from those countries to which the EU policies are addressed. Thus, a fruitful exchange of ideas 
and opinions among the stakeholders involved on the contents of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its 
perception among the partner states could be achieved.  
The expert seminar was organised by the Institut für Europäische Politik (IE) in cooperation with the Finnish Institute of 
International Affairs (FIIA), Helsinki and took place at the premises of FIIA. The conference was generously supported by the 
Federal Foreign Office and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Section IV: Baltic Sea Region – Views on security challenges and dividing lines 
 
Tobias Etzold* 
 
SECURITY IN AND THROUGH REGIONAL COOPERATION  
IN THE BALTIC SEA REGION 
 
 
Security, ‘hard’ and soft’, has always been an underlying feature in the development of the 
Baltic Sea region (BSR). This applies to the Cold War period, in which the region has been 
divided between the Western and the Eastern blocks with the Iron curtain going right through 
its centre, as well as the past 23 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union. Owing to the far reaching and dramatic changes Europe and the region were 
facing, security was definitely one of the primary concerns on the political agenda of the 
countries of the region during the 1990s. However, when regional cooperation emerged in the 
early 1990s, hard and military security did not become an explicit task of those newly 
established regional cooperation structures. Nonetheless, the regional institutions contributed 
through their activities, of which many were and still are related to soft security risks, to 
overall stability and security in the region. 
 
This paper provides a brief overview of developments in the BSR in particular with a view on 
soft and hard security and analyses what contributions to overall stability, safety and security 
the regional cooperation structures and the EU have made in the past 20 years. In particular 
the Northern Dimension (ND) Initiative and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
(EUSBBSR) and their contributions will be highlighted in this context. The paper also 
examines briefly the role of Germany as one of the largest countries of the region as an 
important factor in stabilizing and desecuritizing the region, in particular in relation to the 
other big player in the region, Russia. The paper ends with a number of conclusions, 
observations and future prospects.        
 
BSR cooperation and security 
 
Dealing with hard security threats and fostering related cooperation was not a primary task of 
the regional institutions that emerged in the early 1990s. This highly sensitive field was left to 
established international organisations with a wider scope, especially NATO, including 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) and NATO-Russia partnership, and the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It was not the intention to create any competition with 
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existing and established international organisations in security related cooperation. 
Nonetheless, regional cooperation structures such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States 
(CBSS) dealt from their start and still deal with security risks in a wider sense, in particular 
soft security risks such as trafficking, cross-border organized crime, environmental risks 
through for example hazardous substances and nuclear and radiation safety.  
 
Through their work in general, organizations such as the CBSS, the Helsinki Commission 
(HELCOM), the Baltic Sea States Subregional Cooperation (BSSSC), the Union of Baltic 
Cities (UBC) and the Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference (BSPC) contributed to confidence 
building and stabilizing and desecuritizing the region. The regional cooperation structures 
were successful in organizing an active political dialogue among the countries of the region in 
the early 1990s. This dialogue was very helpful to bring people on very different levels 
together, to get to know each other and to jointly discuss and find possible solutions to 
common, not just multilateral but also even bilateral, problems. Building and consequently 
strengthening mutual understanding, confidence and good neighbourly relations and overall 
regional stability on that basis were therefore considered as the main achievements of Baltic 
Sea cooperation in those early years. Later, also more concrete results in specific issue areas 
such as environment, nuclear and radiation safety and education could be achieved. This way, 
despite some significant conflict potential in particular between Russia and the Baltic states 
and an overall uncertainty over the future development of the region and the place of each 
individual country within it, major conflicts could be prevented in the region.  
 
For the newly independent countries at the Eastern shore of the Baltic Sea, institutions such as 
the CBSS and the EU’s Northern Dimension were significant in developing close ties to the 
Western countries of the region and bringing them closer to EU and NATO since they were 
not immediately able to join those organisations. This, however, was their ultimate and 
primary foreign policy goal. Another important achievement has been Russia’s inclusion in 
regional cooperation. Unlike in the EU and NATO, Russia is an equal partner amongst all 
other members within the CBSS, HELCOM, BSSSC and other BSR organisations.  
 
Once the Baltic states and Poland had joined EU and NATO in 2004 and 1999 respectively, 
the latter became the most important security providers in and for the region. EU and NATO 
accession of these countries, however, also fostered some kind of dividing line within the 
region, namely between EU/NATO members and Russia. The various efforts to involve and 
integrate Russia in the region and in regional cooperation and to mitigate this dividing line 
continue. Russia, however, remains an outsider and a security threat to at least some of the 
countries of the region. Furthermore, up until enlargement the country showed little interest 
and (pro-) activism in regional cooperation. This has slightly changed meanwhile and Russia 
developed a more active approach towards the region and regional cooperation. Nonetheless, 
the region has not turned into a political priority for Moscow. It will be interesting to see 
whether Russia will make use of its CBSS Presidency 2012-2013 to put itself down as an 
active and committed Baltic Sea country. This would be very much welcomed by the other 
countries of the region.       
 
 
EU and BSR security 
 
From the late 1990s onwards, when the prospects of EU enlargement in the region started to 
loom clearer, the EU became more active in the BSR through the Northern Dimension (ND) 
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Initiative and the ND partnerships (environment, public health and welfare, transport and 
logistics, culture). These dealt with particular challenges and issues of interest to all the actors 
in the region, including soft security issues. In the ND and the partnerships, the regional 
aspirations of Baltic Sea actors met the EU’s growing foreign policy ambitions and Russia’s 
enduring great power ambitions.1 Despite tensions between the EU and Russia, the ND has 
managed to promote concrete cooperation between the two sides. The ND has been successful 
in fostering cooperation on low-political issues, avoiding controversial ones, and enhancing 
direct cooperation with Northwest-Russian regions.2    
  
However, despite initiatives such as the ND, the EU’s engagement and commitment in the 
BSR has been rather half-hearted until 2004, leaving the initiative to the EU member states in 
the BSR. Since EU enlargement of 2004, with all countries of the region but Russia having 
joined the EU, the EU became more engaged in and committed to regional cooperation in the 
BSR. The EU recognised the opportunities the region and close regional cooperation has to 
offer also in a wider European perspective. To this end, the most important initiative has been 
the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR). This initiative emerged in the European 
Parliament and has been primarily promoted by Sweden and the European Commission. The 
EUSBSR’s idea was not to create new structures (and new institutions) but rather to exert 
some sort of framing and coordination function for existing cooperation structures and to 
streamline efforts to tackle existing problems. The overall goals of the EUSBSR are: making 
the BSR and the Baltic Sea an environmentally sustainable place; making the region a 
prosperous place by supporting economic development, removing trade barriers and fostering 
innovation; creating an accessible and attractive region by improving transport and energy 
infrastructure.3 The in the context of wider security most interesting objective of the EUSBSR 
is to make the BSR a safe and secure place through close cooperation and effective 
coordination of efforts. To this end, the EUSBSR contains a number of provisions for regional 
security and safety in a wider sense since the aforementioned soft security risks and problems 
do continuously exist in the BSR. To the strategy’s priority areas belong: dealing with 
hazardous substances (including organic contaminants, heavy metals and chemical weapons 
in the sea), maritime safety and security and major emergencies. The latter deals primarily 
with the economic impact of disasters with cross border effects that may adversely affect the 
economic growth and competitiveness of EU regions/the BSR.4 Through these efforts, the EU 
makes a number of valuable contributions to regional cooperation also in a security and safety 
perspective. 
 
A certain risk has, however, not been completely eliminated as yet: the EUSBSR could create 
a new dividing line between EU members and Russia as the latter is not fully included in the 
                                                          
1 Joenniemi, Pertti and Fabrizio Tassinari ‘Security’, in Bernd Henningsen und Tobias Etzold (eds.), Political 
State of the Region Report 2011, (Copenhagen: Baltic Development Forum, 2011), p. 61, 
http://www.bdforum.org/activities/reports-publications/thematic-reports [last accessed on 16 October 2012] 
2 Hagström Frisell, Eva and Ingmar Oldberg (2009) “Cool Neighbors”: Sweden’s EU Presidency and Russia, 
Russie.Nei.Visions n42, IFRI, p. 17, at: http:// 
www.ifri.org/downloads/ifrirussiaandswedenengjune09_1.pdf [last accessed on 12 October 2012]. 
3 Commission of the European Communities (2009a) Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
concerning the European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, Brussels, COM(2009) 248/3, p. 3, 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/communic/baltic/com_baltic_en.pdf [last accessed 
on 16 October 2012]. 
4 See: http://www.balticsea-region-strategy.eu/pages/websites [last accessed on 16 October 2012]. 
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implementation of the strategy. The EUSBSR is an internal EU strategy and aims at 
strengthening the cooperation and coordination among EU members in the first place. 
Nonetheless, the strategy also has an external dimension and aims at including Russia in at 
least parts of the strategy through other channels such as ND and CBSS in which Russia fully 
participates. Also, Russian partners participate in several projects within the strategy’s 
framework. Russia’s involvement in certain policy areas seems important indeed since 
sustainable solutions for some of the region’s major problems, in particular in the field of 
environment and soft security, cannot be achieved without Russian involvement and 
engagement. It still does form a particular challenge for the EU to find ways to involve Russia 
in the implementation of the EUSBSR more closely. Russia was generally positive towards 
the strategy, provided it will not have a negative effect on already existing cooperation 
frameworks such as the CBSS and ND. Russia rather welcomed the EU’s intention to foster 
its involvement in BSR cooperation through the strategy.  
 
Germany’s role and (security) interests in the BSR 
 
While international and regional cooperation can generally profit from the input of big 
countries that in many cases have been able to take on a certain leadership role and to move 
the cooperation on, Germany as one of the biggest countries of the BSR has mostly been a 
rather reluctant partner in regional cooperation. There are several indications that the German 
federal government, representing a country right in the centre of Europe, did not have an 
outstanding political interest in the region for most of the past 20 years. The region was and is 
only one of many fields within Germany’s foreign relations; its foreign policy priorities are 
different.5 However, economically, Germany is deeply integrated in the region and is the most 
prominent trading partner for most of the countries of the BSR.6 In particular for the German 
states (Bundesländer) with a Baltic Sea coastline the BSR is of outer importance. Even more 
than the German federal government, they played and still play a pivotal role in regional 
cooperation on the sub-national level and even beyond.7 To some extent, Germany has also 
contributed to the development of the region and regional cooperation. Most prominently, the 
former German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, initiated together with his Danish 
counterpart, Uffe Elleman-Jensen, the launch of the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) 
in 1992. Especially Genscher, however, did not seem interested in turning the CBSS into a 
strong and influential actor. They rather perceived the body as a symbol for the changes in the 
region and for building relations between the countries of the region rather than as a motor for 
cooperation.8 Germany’s reluctance in engaging more vividly in the region was to some 
extent linked to Germany’s special relationship to Russia. The country tried to avoid actions, 
                                                          
5 Tobias Etzold: ‘A country on the brink of a region? Germany’s Baltic Sea policies’, Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung 
e.V. (ed.) International Reports, Berlin, May 16, 2012, p. 1, http://www.kas.de/wf/en/33.31041/ [last accessed 
on 16 October 2012]. 
6 Carsten Schymik, ‘Germany’, in Bernd Henningsen und Tobias Etzold (eds.), Political State of the Region 
Report 2011, Copenhagen: Baltic Development Forum, 2011, p. 29, http://www.bdforum.org/activities/reports-
publications/thematic-reports [last accessed on 16 October 2012]. 
7 Etzold, as FN 5, p. 1. 
8 Carl-Einar Stålvant, ‘The Council of Baltic Sea States’, in Andrew Cottey (Hrsg.) Subregional cooperation in 
the new Europe: building security, prosperity and solidarity from the Barents to the Black Sea (New York: 
Macmillan, 1999), p. 58. 
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for instance, a strong engagement in the Baltic states and Kaliningrad9, that could have given 
Russia a sense of a German ambition to play a dominant role in the region, reawakening the 
still fresh memories about the German past. Bearing this in mind, Germany avoided showing 
any “great-power ambitions” in or around the BSR.10 Through this non-active approach, 
Germany tried to contribute to confidence-building in a rather unusual way. Other countries, 
in particular the Baltic states, would, however have wished a more pro-active German stance 
and more German support and back-up.    
 
In safety and security terms, without doubts the BSR has some relevance for Germany. While 
currently no direct military threat for Germany exists in the region, it is in Germany’s interest 
to maintain the region stable. Germany, as the other countries of the region, is strongly 
affected by the region’s soft security risks. Also from a security point of view, sound bilateral 
relations with Russia and inclusion of Russia in regional cooperation are of particular 
importance also for Germany. In order to avoid any future major problems and conflicts in the 
region, it is of importance and should be in Germany’s interest to keep the political dialogue 
and the close regional cooperation up. During its recent CBSS Presidency, Germany focussed 
on revitalising and maintaining the political dialogue, putting a strong emphasis on keeping 
Russia involved, and did a good job in this respect. Beyond its CBSS presidency, Germany 
should keep this active approach up and remain actively involved in regional cooperation. 
Germany is needed as a reliable partner in regional affairs. The other (smaller) countries of 
the region appreciate that Germany as a big member state and important country within the 
EU shows some presence in the BSR and plays an active role in regional cooperation, making 
its contribution to creating and maintaining a prosperous, safe and stable region.     
 
 
Conclusions and future prospects 
 
On average, the BSR became a safer and more secure place through cooperation in areas other 
than hard/military security. Regional cooperation contributed to confidence-building among 
the countries of the region and enhanced the region’s stability. However, some kind of 
security dividing line within the region remains: EU/NATO members versus Russia. Despite 
various efforts to integrate Russia in the region/regional cooperation and at least some form of 
commitment and engagement from the Russian side, Russia remains an outsider and a, 
(theoretical) security threat to at least some of the countries of the region. Germany’s 
commitment remains an important factor in regional cooperation as the country might be able 
to mitigate a possible Russian threat due to its special relationship to Russia. Therefore, 
Germany should continue to play an important role in maintaining the regional political 
dialogue with Russia. In the near future it will remain important to effectively cooperate with 
Russia, encouraging the country’s interest and commitment in the BSR and giving the country 
a sense that its regional involvement is regarded as important by the other countries of the 
Region. On the other hand, it is not strictly necessary for the other countries of the region to 
always give in to every Russian sensitivity and demand if this does not serve a wider regional 
interest. All the other countries of the region should be equally involved in the region and 
their interests taken equally into account. It would be a wrong signal towards them if the main 
focus of regional cooperation and dialogue would be on Russia alone. Through initiatives 
                                                          
9 Bernd Henningsen, ‘At the Dawn of German CBSS Presidency: Hopes vs. Doubts’, Opinion article in Baltinfo 
- The Official Journal of the Council of the Baltic Sea States, No 32, October 2000, Stockholm, pp. 4-5.  
10 Axel Krohn, ‘Germany‘, in: Axel Krohn (ed.) The Baltic Sea Region: National and International Security 
Perspectives, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1996, p. 96.  
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such as ND and EUSBSR the EU became an increasingly important actor in regional 
cooperation and will even more remain relevant in stabilising the BSR and moving regional 
cooperation on in the future. Also regional institutions such as the CBSS are still needed in 
order to maintain the regional political dialogue and concrete regional cooperation and to 
develop and maintain the BSR as a safe, prosperous and stable place.     
 
 
 
